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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines a series of problems that the United States has encountered in its 
space systems acquisition process, and how these problems have impacted national 
security. This thesis has also examines several space system projects, and analyzes the 
various elements contributing to increased project cost and major project delays. Based 
on this assessment, it is concluded that although the space acquisition process has gone 
through a number of significant changes over the past 50 years, it is questionable that 
lessons learned from past acquisition experiences coupled with implemented space 
acquisition process changes has led to significant progress. Several recommendations are 
made to improve the acquisition process.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines problems that the United States (U.S.) has encountered 
regarding the space systems procurement process. The disastrous experience of the 
Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) satellites has led many to question whether the current 
space acquisition system is effective. Defense experts say the entire acquisition system 
for space-based imagery technologies is in danger of breaking down.1  
Although the overall acquisition process may be faced with numerous challenges, 
the goal of this thesis is to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD) space acquisition system, in addition to the National Reconnaissance 
Office (NRO) procurement process, and to identify potential improvement and 
streamlining opportunities. Importantly, this thesis does not discuss the procurement 
process for classified projects, because these types of projects are time sensitive and are 
subject to process waivers. For example, the NRO has a waiver from full and open 
competition, but competes classified projects with contractors that have the appropriate 
security clearances.2 However, for unclassified projects, full and open competition is a 
critical part of the procurement process. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The United States relies on space for a number of purposes, such as information 
on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), early warning of missile launches, as well as 
deterrence of other foreign military threats. As Philip Taubman argues, “Even though 
reconnaissance satellites are less useful in spying on terrorist groups than on more 
traditional threats like foreign military forces, they remain integral to intelligence and 
military operations, including monitoring nuclear and missile installations in Iran and 
                                                 
1 Philip Taubman, “In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids,” The New 
York Times, November 11, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/washington/11satellite.html?_r=1#step1. 
2 Joe Mazur, Jr., “The Real Secret to Acquiring Space Systems,” Air Force Journal of Logistics 
(Winter 2003): 7. 
 2 
North Korea. They are also critical to Pentagon mapmaking and the targeting of 
precision-guided weapons like cruise missiles.”3 Within the United States, space assets 
also provide critical information, such as warning of weather-related problems, and 
information necessary to prevent natural or economic disasters.  
It is the goal of this thesis to analyze and explore the challenges of the space 
acquisition process, practices and how this process can potentially impact national 
security.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS  
The procurement process as a whole can be described as a broad and complicated 
system. It starts first with an acquisition plan that addresses all the technical, business, 
management, and other significant considerations that control the acquisition.4 
During the early phase of the procurement process, several actions usually occur 
prior to the award of government contracts. These actions include project planning and 
verification that funds are available. A need also exists for market research to ensure that 
the government is not being charged too much for items purchased. The two commonly 
used methods are the bidding of potential contractors or a determination that a 
corporation has developed technology that other corporations have not yet developed.  
Another key aspect of the procurement process is the award and monitoring 
phases of the contract. These two phases are critical for timely delivery of the end 
product. In the end, the procurement process must be smoothed out and perfected to 
avoid potential blind spots in space architecture that ultimately could affect U.S. national 
security.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Taubman, “In Death of Spy Satellite Program, Lofty Plans and Unrealistic Bids.”  
4 Ibid. 
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Several examples of the problems facing the procurement process occurred with 
FIA, which was under the directive of the NRO. The NRO is the single national 
organization tasked to meet the satellite needs for unique and innovative technology, 
large-scale systems engineering, development, acquisitions, and operations of space 
reconnaissance and operational systems.5  
In 2001, the NRO was set to spend roughly $6 billion on the FIA satellite system 
through 2010, with billions more allocated for upgrades and replacements.6 However, 
this project experienced extreme cost overruns, postponed delivery dates, and poor 
project oversight. Between the time the contract was awarded to Boeing in 1999 and 
2005, the government spent over $10 billion on FIA, including roughly $5 billion in cost 
overruns.7 The government canceled the multibillion-dollar effort after concluding that 
prime contractor, Boeing Integrated Defense Systems of St. Louis, which was well over 
budget and behind schedule on the system, would not be able turn things around. At the 
same time, the NRO tapped Denver-based Lockheed Martin Space Systems—the 
longtime incumbent unseated by Boeing in the FIA competition to bring together a 
solution based on legacy technology and hardware.8 
While this thesis recognizes numerous problems and challenges affect the space 
procurement process, the entire process cannot be fixed overnight. Therefore, the goal of 
this thesis is to: 1) promote a better understanding of the procurement process, 2) 
integrate key suggestions by the end user and procurement experts into viable solutions, 
and 3) identify critical policies and regulations that will allow the customer, decision 
makers and project managers the flexibility to make sound judgments in a timely manner, 
which could possibly lead to reduced project overruns and delays.  
                                                 
5 Mazur,“The Real Secret to Acquiring Space Systems,” 3. 
6 Michael A. Dornheim, “FIA Outline Takes Shape,” GlobalSecurity.Org, December 21, 2001, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2001/011221-fia.htm. 
7 “Future Imagery Architecture [FIA]-2005 Restructuring,” GlobalSecurity.Org, (n.d.), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/fia-2005.htm. 
8 Turner Brinton, “NRO Director Defends Plan for Eloctro-Optical Spy Satellites,” Space News, 
October 9, 2009.  
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D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is based on unclassified primary and secondary sources, including 
government documents, federal regulations, scholarly articles, press releases, and 
practical experience. The goal of this thesis is to examine and identify problems areas in 
the acquisition process, particularly related to space systems. Secondly, this thesis uses 
comparative case studies of other similar acquisition projects to identify strengths and 
weaknesses and to develop policy recommendations for the future. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. The first chapter describes the thesis 
topic and research questions, and the importance of this research. The second chapter 
gives an historical overview of the acquisition process. Chapter III defines the existing an 
overview of space procurement process, and governing regulations and policies. Chapter 
IV focuses on the impacts of the space acquisition process on national security. Chapter 
V includes several case studies of space projects as well as an objective analysis of 
project failures. Chapter VI provides a conclusion followed by recommendations.  
 5 
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE SPACE PROCUREMENT 
PROCESS 
During the World War II era, the DoD did not have a centralized office to handle 
military contracts or routine purchases. Historically, each branch of the armed services, 
which include the Navy, Marines, Army and Air Force, was responsible for handling its 
own contracts, which accounted for the purchasing of weapons and supplies.9 The lack of 
a governing agency to oversee the procurement process for these separate armed branches 
led to a large duplication of efforts.  
The established of many DoD procurement policies, management techniques and 
methods in place today are a direct outcome of the planning and efforts of the Kennedy 
administration. The historical acquisition reform and changes that have shaped the space 
procurement process, as known today, were impacted by the politics and issues of their 
time.  
Chapter II discusses the evolution of the space and defense procurement process 
as established during the decades of the late 1950s and 1960s, up to the present time. 
Further, this chapter also discusses various military and civilian agencies established to 
oversee the overall procurement programs and contracts.  
The space procurement process evolved out of the need for the United States to 
improve intelligence gathering during the Cold War era. The U.S.’ primary goal was to 
improve reconnaissance techniques, promote technical advancement and develop the 
future space industry. The initial strategy to develop and deploy spacecraft was a product 
of President Eisenhower’s New Look Policy.10 Eisenhower realized from previous 
experiences that military success was contingent upon accurate intelligence.11 Since the 
Soviet bloc was a closed society, and coupled with U.S. military demand to build 
                                                 
9 AllGov, “Defense Contract Management Agency,” (n.d.), 
http://www.allgov.com/Agency/Defense_Contract_Management_Agency. 
10 Eligar Sadeh, Space Politics and Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective (Space Regulations Library) 
(Dordrecht, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 251. 
11 Ibid. 
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expensive new weapons to counter its guesses at what the Soviets might be building, 
Eisenhower was convinced of the necessity for hard photographic and signal intelligence 
upon which to base weapons acquisitions decisions.12 During his presidency, he 
authorized flights over the Soviet Union and pushed for the development of new 
technologies for reconnaissance.13  
With the growing fear that the Soviets were developing new atomic weapons and 
new space technology that would give them air space dominance, the United States 
continued to develop space technology. However, in 1957, the Soviets launched the 
satellite Sputnik, which forced the United States to rethink its approach to being a world 
leader in space and space policy. During this time, the Eisenhower administration had to 
expedite space research and development by considering: 1) a reorganization of military 
space efforts, 2) the establishment of civilian agencies, and 3) increased budgets for 
research.  
In 1958, the Eisenhower administration imposed a reorganization that led to 
several major changes. The first was the signed legislation that placed the Secretary of 
Defense directly under the President in the military chain of command,14 which was a 
major step in the centralization of procurement because all service chiefs were tasked 
with the operations of administration, procurement, recruitment and training. Secondly, a 
change occurred in the authority of the position of the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering (DDR&E) with the Office of Secretary of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1959.15 This act gave the DDR&E control of all DoD Research & Development 
programs, including their funding.16 Thirdly, the DoD created the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA), whose primary purpose was to manage all military space 
programs and anti-missile defenses.17 ARPA received a broad charter to encourage 
                                                 
12 Sadeh, Space Politics and Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective (Space Regulations Library), 251. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Wilbur D. Jones, Jr., Arming The Eagle: A History of U.S. Weapons Acquisition Since 1775 
(Defense Systems Management College Press, 1999), 327. 
15 Sadeh, Space Politics and Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective (Space Regulations Library), 253. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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innovation and long-term technologies. Fourthly, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) was created on National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
(NACA)’s existing foundation to operate the civilian space program.  
In 1960, John F. Kennedy was elected president of the United States, arguably on 
the basis that the previous administration wanted to use space technology primarily for 
reconnaissance. However, President Kennedy had the vision of sending a man into space. 
With this approach to space advancement, opportunities arose for civilian companies to 
be considered contractors for future space programs. This being the case, it became 
evident that the existing procurement process would need to be refined to increase project 
oversight on these larger projects, select the most experienced companies, and ensure that 
the government was getting exactly what it was paying for. To meet these demands, 
President Kennedy appointed former Ford Motor Company president Robert S. 
McNamara to serve as Secretary of Defense for the purpose of centralizing the 
procurement process and strengthening the early acquisition process. During his tenure as 
Secretary of Defense, McNamara created the Office of Systems Analysis to perform cost-
effectiveness studies and encouraged the services to do likewise. Additionally, he 
developed a number of acquisition organizations including the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency, the Defense Contract Administration Service, and the Defense Supply 
Agency.18  
McNamara’s staff implemented the development concept paper (DCP), total 
package procurement, and concepts and techniques to increase competition, and it 
incentivized contracting and the network for planning and scheduling.19 An example of 
the network’s planning and scheduling is the implementation of the Programming, 
Planning and Budgeting System across the DoD to provide for long-term budget forecasts 
corresponding to technical and strategic assessments, and to unite the formerly separated 
budgeting and spending processes.20  
                                                 
18 Lawrence R. Benson, “Acquisition Management in the United States Air Force and its 
Predecessors” (master’s thesis, Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 29. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Sadeh, Space Politics and Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective (Space Regulations Library), 256. 
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During the 1960s, it was challenging for civilian companies to compete for 
government space program contracts from the DoD or NASA. One of the reasons was 
that although the government encouraged open competition for contracts, it was difficult 
for new companies to be considered for contract awards. To counter this obstacle, 
companies began to focus their efforts in specific areas of expertise to place their 
companies in a greater competitive position. Nonetheless, it was soon discovered that just 
because a company was the best qualified and had the best technical experience, these 
qualities did not always guarantee a contract. For example, when NASA put out bids for 
the Apollo Command and Service Module in 1962, the Glen L. Martin Company won the 
competition based on its overall score.21 However, NASA Administrator James Webb 
did not believe in Martin’s ability to work with astronauts because Martin’s engineers 
had not worked with aircraft or test pilots for over a decade.22 By contrast, the second 
highest scoring bid, by North American Aviation, featured its concurrent expertise with 
NASA’s test pilots on the X-15 program.23 NASA ended up selecting North American 
over Martin.  
Another aspect of obtaining space contracts was based on contacts within either 
NASA or the DoD. During this era, having a good inside connection with the contract 
awarding agencies also proved fruitful as evidenced by MIT Instrumentation 
Laboratory’s win of the Apollo guidance computer contract because James Webb, a 
NASA administrator, personally knew and trusted Charles Stark Draper, MIT’s guidance 
expert.24  
The Air Force had a major influence on the space procurement process as well. In 
March 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, gave Secretary of the 
Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert an opportunity to oversee the military space program and 
reform the existing procurement process in a way that would support the Air Force 
Systems Command (AFSC) that later became the Air Force Logistics Command 
                                                 
21 Sadeh, Space Politics and Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective (Space Regulations Library), 256. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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(AFLC).25 Mr. Zuckert immediately implemented departmental changes to accomplish 
this objective. These changes included merging command functions of the Air Force 
Research and Development Command (ARDC), the AFSC, which gave it procurement 
authority, as well as the AFLC by transferring its three system centers and contract 
management offices to the AFSC. The ARDC was later transferred to the Office of 
Aerospace Research.26  
Although these changes appeared confusing, the goal was to streamline project 
development for both weapon and space systems. The Air Force continued to reform 
procurement processes by returning to many of the contracting strategies introduced by 
McNamara, such as programming and budgeting systems featuring a five-year plan. The 
Air Force Ballistic Missile Division also developed the critical management process 
called “configuration management.” Configuration management was a technique to tie 
the engineering changes to cost predictions and control the overall cost.27 This 
management tool made it difficult for the project or system to be modified or changed 
arbitrarily.28 Moreover, if project changes were to occur, these changes would need to be 
presented before a configuration control board. All changes required estimates of the cost 
and schedule impact of the technical modifications, which allowed the manager to trade 
off the costs of a change to a benefit.29 This management tool proved to be effective in 
controlling overall cost and keeping projects within budget. This technique was so 
effective that it was implemented throughout the federal procurement process. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Benson, “Acquisition Management in the United States Air Force and its Predecessors,” 31. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Sadeh, Space Politics and Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective (Space Regulations Library), 257. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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Even though multiple project management models were implemented for both 
weapon and space systems, concerns still existed regarding system timeliness. A point of 
criticism was the total package procurement concept (PPC). This concept gave wide 
programmatic responsibilities to prime contractors to both develop and produce 
systems.30  
In “Acquisition Management in the United States,” the author argues, “the scope 
of the programs made cost predictions difficult and led to unrealistic bids. An example of 
this was the attempt to develop the Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX), which became 
the F-111 as a multi-purpose aircraft for both the Air Force and the Navy. The total 
procurement process led to an unrealistically low bid, which made it difficult to correct 
the cost overrun.31” However, the PPC led to detailed proposals, studies, competitions, 
report audits, program reviews, and oversight tools.32  
Issues, such as cost overruns and congressional concerns during the decades of 
the 1970s and 1980s, led to further implementation of reforms that impacted both defense 
and space procurement. For instance, in the Nixon administration, another round of 
procurement reform occurred in 1969. Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard (co-
founder of Hewlett-Packard) led these efforts of procurement policy reform.33 These 
policy changes included detailed selected acquisition reports to Congress, more realistic 
cost estimates, more precisely defined operational requirements, technical risk analyses, 
less concurrency in favor of sequential schedules, and a return to the practice of building 
prototype aeronautics systems. They also led to strengthening the practices of the 
procurement process.  
 
 
                                                 
30 Benson, “Acquisition Management in the United States Air Force and its Predecessors,” 33. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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The Carter administration took a more conservative approach to stabilizing the 
acquisition process through defense cuts. The conventional wisdom of this administration 
was to reduce the size of an organization, which led to an overall reduction in both 
funding and spending.34 This conservative approach extended into the space procurement 
process by reducing the space projects.  
The Reagan administration reversed the trend of the previous administration and 
significantly increased defense spending. During his tenure, President Reagan not only 
effectuated military buildup, but also implemented various acquisition policy changes. In 
early 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci, launched a program of 32 
acquisitions-related initiatives. During this program, he encouraged the tailoring of 
management practices to suit specific programs, as well as multi-procurement, budgeting 
flexibility, and pre-planned product improvement.35 These streamlining and centralizing 
practices were called the Carlucci initiatives.  
The Carlucci initiatives were criticized on several points, such as reliability, 
maintainability, and supportability of complex new systems addressed in the initiative. 
The primary problem was the split in responsibility in the Air Force with respect to 
acquisition and logistics.36 In an effort to recentralize these duties, the Air Force created 
the Air Force Logistics Center.  
As the Reagan defense buildup continued to reach its peak, the AFSC’s projects 
encompassed many major programs, such as aircraft, satellites, and command and control 
equipment that relied increasingly on computer hardware and software for both 
performance and maintenance diagnostics, which was especially true for the electronic 
warfare, avionics, and command and control capabilities. During this time, numerous 
unanticipated issues and problems occurred during the subsystems integration period, 
which provided an opportunity for critics to identify weaknesses in the procurement 
process. 
                                                 
34 Daniel R. Malin, “Back to the Future: Returning U.S. Space Acquisition to Glory,” Air Command 
and Staff College, April 2006, 18. 
35 Benson, “Acquisition Management in the United States Air Force and its Predecessors,” 40. 
36 Ibid. 
 12 
With respect to the procurement processes in place, the 1980s brought 
bureaucratic pressures supported by the General Accounting Office (GAO), and military 
leaders, as well as public scrutiny. On September 5, 1982, President Reagan signed into 
law the Department of Defense (DoD) Act 1983 (P.L.97-252), known as the Nunn-
McCurdy Act.37 The Nunn-McCurdy Act required the DoD to report to Congress 
whenever a major defense acquisition program experiences cost overruns.38 The purpose 
of this act was to help control the cost of major defense systems by holding Pentagon and 
defense officials publically accountable and responsible for managing cost.39  
By the late 1980s, evidence of waste and corruption was brought to light by 
“Operation Ill-Wind,” which was a far-ranging federal investigation into fraud in the 
defense contracting industry.40 Those implicated included contractors, consultants, and 
DoD personnel. This case further deteriorated the credibility of the procurement process. 
Due to several critical issues related to the acquisition process, the Packard 
Commission released its final report in June 1986. Amidst numerous recommendations, it 
called for the DoD to “establish unambiguous authority for overall acquisition policy, 
clear accountability for acquisition execution, and plain lines of command for those with 
program management responsibilities, as well as additional project and program 
oversight.”41 The commission further called for a more streamlined structure consisting 
of a Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) who would act like the chief executive officer 
of a major corporation, Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) to perform CEO principle 
duties, Program Executives Officers (PEOs) to manage related major programs, and 
Program Managers (PMs) who would report directly to their program executive officer. 
Upon completing their review, the Packard commission of reported that Congress made  
 
                                                 
37 Moshe Schwartz, “The Nunn-McCurdy Act: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress,” 
Federation of American Scientists, June 21, 2010, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41293.pdf. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Jeffrey L. Levy, “An Ill Wind blows: Restricting the Public’s Right of Access to Search Warrant 
Affidavits,” LexisNexis, February 1990, https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com. 
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on-going changes to well over 1,800 separate defense programs in the budget, and 
directed the initiation of 458 studies ranging from the feasibility of simplified acquisition 
to complex systems acquisition.42  
During the 1990s, President Clinton reversed the defense spending trends of his 
predecessor and took a more conservative approach to defense spending, a view similar 
to that of President Jimmy Carter, which entailed defense spending, research and 
development, and project management being held in accordance with approved initiatives 
and bureaucratic processes. An example is the Spaced-based Infrared System (SBIRS) 
contract awarded in 1998 for $2 billion. This program was celebrated as a revolutionary 
concept applied to all defense concepts.43 This process suffered major cost overruns and 
time delays causing this project to be eight years off schedule and roughly $8 billion over 
budget.44  
President George W. Bush authorized the U.S. National Space Policy on August 
31, 2006. This policy established several principles, goals and guidelines for peaceful 
exploration, growth in the commercial space sector, as well as guidelines for space 
acquisition. The 2006 U.S. National Space Policy stated, “The United States is committed 
to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the 
benefit of all humanity.”45  
The National Space Policy principle encouraged development in the commercial 
space sector and states, “The United States is committed to encouraging and facilitating a 
growing and entrepreneurial U.S. commercial space sector. Toward that end, the United 
States Government will use U.S. commercial space capabilities to the maximum practical 
extent, consistent with national security.”46  
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45 Federation of American Scientists, “U.S. National Space Policy,” August 31, 2006, 
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The Space Policy further established two goals that supported and encouraged 
growth in the commercial sector: 1) enable a dynamic, globally competitive domestic 
commercial space sector to promote innovation, strengthen U.S. leadership, and protect 
national, homeland and economic security, and 2) enable a robust science and technology 
base supporting national security, homeland security, and civil space activities.47 These 
goals built a foundation for the implementation of the General Guidelines. 
The General Guidelines that were developed to meet the subject goals and 
improve the space acquisition process included developing space professionals, 
improving space development and procurement, and increasing and strengthening 
interagency partnerships.48  
President Barack Obama authorized a new U.S. National Space Policy on June 
28, 2010. This policy establishes Intersector Guidelines for peaceful exploration, growth 
in the commercial space sector, as well as guidelines for space acquisition. 
The President has established several key points vital to the acquisition process. 
These points are developing and retaining space professionals, as well as improving 
space development and procurement processes.  
The Space Policy states, “The primary goals of space professional development 
and retention are: achieving mission success in space operations and acquisition; 
stimulating innovation to improve commercial, civil, and national security space 
capabilities; and advancing science, exploration, and discovery. Toward these ends, 
departments and agencies, in cooperation with industry and academia, shall establish 
standards, seek to create opportunities for the current space workforce, and implement 
measures to develop, maintain, and retain skilled space professionals, including 
engineering and scientific personnel and experienced space system developers and 
operators, in government and commercial workforces. Departments and agencies also  
 
 
                                                 
47 Federation of American Scientists, “U.S. National Space Policy.” 
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shall promote and expand public-private partnerships to foster educational achievement 
in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) programs, supported by 
targeted investments in such initiatives.”49  
The second key point of the Space Policy is improving the space system 
development and procurement processes. The Space Policy states, “Departments and 
agencies shall: Improve timely acquisition and deployment of space systems through 
enhancements in estimating costs, technological risk and maturity, and industrial base 
capabilities; Reduce programmatic risk through improved management of requirements 
and by taking advantage of cost-effective opportunities to test high-risk components, 
payloads, and technologies in space or relevant environments; Embrace innovation to 
cultivate and sustain an entrepreneurial U.S. research and development environment; and 
Engage with industrial partners to improve processes and effectively manage the supply 
chains.”50  
Over the past 50 years, various attempts have been made to improve the overall 
space procurement process through streamlining and acquisition reform; however, it is 
difficult to identify the cause for the breakdowns in U.S. processes that lead to delays and 
cost overruns, not to mention the best approach to mitigate these issues. The question is, 
“where is the bottleneck?” Is the problem the space procurement process itself, or is it the 
fault of the political and bureaucratic pressures that drive these changes? Some have 
argued that the cause of procurement issues are ambiguous procurement directives; others 
have argued that enormous and ever-changing political and bureaucratic pressures occur 
that make it difficult for the procurement process to work smoothly. Nonetheless, it is the 
goal of this thesis to examine the defense procurement process in comparison to the space 
procurement process.  
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III. SPACE PROCUREMENT PROCESS  
In the United States, the federal government has a complicated and fragmented 
organizational structure. In other words, the federal procurement operates within a 
democratic framework under the constitutional check and balances powers of the three 
branches of government: legislative, judiciary, and executive.51  
While the courts are not directly involved in setting procurement policies and 
rules, they try all legal cases that involve the federal government, including contract 
disputes, in which their decisions become a source of federal procurement regulations.52 
The Congress primarily influences the federal procurement system through laws, budget 
appropriations, and its oversight powers. It passes laws establishing procurement policies 
and procedures, and appropriates funds for procurement purposes, within the time and 
amount of funds specified.53 In addition, the Senate and Congress oversee federal 
procurement through their various standing committees. For example, the Senate has the 
armed services, government affairs and small business committees, while the House of 
Representatives has national securities, government reform and oversight, and small 
business committees.54  
In principle, the President is responsible for implementing procurement statues 
and procurement authorization and appropriations.55 His role is to establish government-
wide acquisition policies and procedures through executive orders, make political and 
management decisions relative to procurement programs, and appoint agency heads and 
other officials who have direct or indirect management control over procurement 
                                                 
51 David Drabkin and Khi V. Thai, “U.S. Federal Government Procurement: Structure, Process and 
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52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 3. 
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programs and procurement organization.56 As the federal government spends a large 
budget on procurement, roughly $200 billion annually, and procures a great variety of 
goods, services and capital assets, its procurement administration has a centralized 
structure to maintain a uniform standard of control, as well as a decentralized structure 
allowing flexibility to meet the unique requirements of over 60 federal agencies.57  
Overall, the basic procurement process involves an agency that identifies the 
goods and services it needs. That agency can also provide market research that evaluates 
the best price available. However, this process can prove to be different when reviewing 
space programs because these acquisitions are high priced, involve a number of people in 
the completion of the project, and could extend over a period of five to 10 years.  
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) guides the basic procurement process. 
The FAR is the primary regulation used by all federal executive agencies in their 
acquisition.58 The FAR became effective in April 1, 1984, and was intended to minimize 
redundant agency acquisition regulations, as well as limit agency acquisition regulations 
to those necessary to implement FAR policies and procedures within an agency. It also 
provides for coordination, simplicity and uniformity the federal acquisition process.59 
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) is a supplemental 
document that contains expansive policies and procedures for those grey areas not 
covered in the FAR.60 Although the FAR and the DFARS are the overall documents that 
govern the procurement process for large and small acquisitions, the DoD National 
Security Space Acquisition Policy (NSS) Directive 03-01 governs the space acquisition 
process.  
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58 General Services, Administration Department of Defense National Aeronautics, and Space 
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59 Ibid. 
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The NSS 03-01 provides an ideal roadmap designed to facilitate the development, 
production, and deployment of space systems.61 This process begins with an 
understanding of the end user’s requirements and is characterized by five phases. 
• Pre KDP A: Concept Studies 
• Phase A: Concept development 
• Phase B: Preliminary design 
• Phase C: Complete design 
• Phase D: Build and Operations 
It is important to note that the space systems fall into two categories, either a 
Small Quantity Model, which is typically bought in quantities of 10 or less, in 
comparison with the Large Quantity Models, which are bought in quantities of 50 or 
more.  
Second, NSS 03-01 uses a structured review like Key Decision Points (KDPs) to 
assess whether a program is ready to process into the next phase using very well-defined 
and distinctive criteria, which are customized by each phase.62 KDPs also ensure senior 
senior-level involvement early in the acquisition process, and serve as timely and focused 
independent assessments before proceeding into the next acquisition phase.63 See 
Diagram 1. 
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Diagram 1. NSS: 03-01 Acquisition Phases64 
The Under Secretary of the Air force (USecAF) is the DoD Space Milestone 
Decision Authority (MDA) for all DoD Space Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs).65 The MDA expects proof and verification that the project is ready to proceed 
to the next phase, and it cautious about authorizing a program to move ahead.66 The 
MDA bases his decision of whether a project is mature to move to the next phase based 
on several principles that include mission success, accountability, streamlined/agile, 
flexibility, and whether the project budget is stable.67 See the List of Process Principles, 
Evaluation Criteria and Findings for the principle definitions in the Appendix.  
Although the USecAF is the DoD MDA, the acquisition of DoD space systems is 
subject to the interaction of three complementary processes: 1) the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System under the authority of the Chairman of the Joints 
Chiefs of Staff, 2) planning, programming, budgeting, and 3) execution process under the 
authority of the DoD Comptroller, and the NSS acquisitions process under the authority 
                                                 
64 National Security Space Acquisition Policy, NO03-01, December 27, 2004.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Green, Heppard, and Tremaine, Space and Defense Policy, The Acquisition Process: Acquiring 
Technology for Space and Defense, 237–238. 
67 Ibid., 3. 
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of the Space MDA.68 To work effectively, the space acquisition process requires constant 
coordination among processes and their authorities.69 Each process is listed below. These 
processes are further defined in the List of Process Principles, Evaluation Criteria and 
Values for principle definitions in the Appendix.  
5.1 Joint Capabilities integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
The JCIDS process identifies, develops, and validates all defense-related 
capability needs.  
 
5.2 Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process 
(PPBE) 
The PPBE process translates military capability needs into budgetary 
requirements, which are presented to Congress for funding consideration.  
 
5.3 National Security Space (NSS) Acquisition Process 
The NSS model emphasizes the decision needs for “high-tech” small 
quantity NSS programs. The funding profile for a typical NSS program is 
usually front-loaded when compared to a production-focused system.  
Although these processes are in place to provide space systems oversight, they 
also ensure that these systems follow the systems acquisition, systems acquisition and 
sustainment phases as shown in Diagram 1.  
Nonetheless, based on the several space programs that have encountered project 
delays and increased cost, it is arguable that the phases identified in the NSS: 03-01 are 
being followed or monitored. Space programs that do not have adequate funding, suffer 
from technical issues or immature technology should be flagged before they are able to 
move to the next development phases. However, it is not clear how these space programs 
are being allowed to move through the critical project phases. Additionally, based on the 
checks and balances built into the space acquisition process, projects cannot move into 
development phases without approval from senior level management. Chapter V further 
addresses several examples of projects that have encountered some of the issues 
previously mentioned. 
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IV. THE IMPACTS OF SPACE ACQUISITION ON NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
The space acquisition process has experienced a number of reforms over the past 
50 years to improve process effectiveness and efficiency. Although these reforms were to 
improve the space acquisition process, several instances of gaps in U.S. satellite defense 
and imaging systems occurred because the acquisition process has struggled with 
providing the products and services in a timely and cost-effective manner. Much of the 
criticism of the procurement process revolves around the issue that the acquisition 
process is long and cumbersome with respect to research and development of weapons 
and space systems. Other problems include increasing project cost, unrealistic budgets, 
lack of mature technology, unstable staff, and poor government/customer planning 
strategies.70  
Although the goal of this thesis is to address the pertinent issues within the space 
acquisition process as they relate to national security, it is also important to understand 
and identify several broader issues and dynamics that not only impact the overall 
acquisition process, which includes space acquisition, but ultimately, national security. 
One of the major concerns with the space acquisition process as it relates to weapons and 
space systems is whether certain disconnects are embedded within the acquisition process 
itself, or instead, management oversight of the process. In a report prepared by the Staff 
of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 2005 Executive Summary, Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA), the committee focused of several root problems that 
impact the procurement process. The report stated, “The Senate Armed Services 
Committee was concerned that problems with organization structure, shortfalls is 
acquisition workforce capabilities, personnel structure, and personnel instability continue 
to undermine the performance of major weapons systems programs.”71  
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In the DAPA report, Acting Secretary of Defense Gordon England authorized an 
integrated assessment to consider aspects of the acquisition process.72 This extensive 
research focused on research, observations, and interviews with subject matter experts 
that resulted in an integrated acquisition performance assessment. The key points taken 
from the DAPA report included findings, integrated assessments, and recommendations. 
Several key findings address both internal external impacts of the procurement process. 
These findings are listed below.  
• The acquisition system must deal with external instability, a changing 
security environment and challenging national issues73 
• A DoD management model based on lack of trust-oversight is preferred to 
accountability74 
• Oversight is complex, it was program-focused-not process focused.75 
• Complex acquisition programs do not promote success; they increase cost 
and schedule76 
• The DoD elects short-term savings and flexibility at the expanse of long-
term cost increases77 
The DAPA Panel defined the acquisition process as one of the elements that falls 
within a larger acquisition system. The panel further defined the acquisition system to be 
a simple construct reflecting efficient integration of three interdependent processes, 
termed Big “A.”78 The little “a” as the acquisition process states “how to buy’ but does 
not include requirements and budget, which creates competing values and objectives The 
processes are budget, requirements, and acquisition, a shows in Diagram 2 (Acquisition 
System).79  
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Diagram 2. Acquisition System80 
The DAPA evaluated the acquisition process not as a process but as a system. 
This system is composed of three parts: budget, requirements and acquisition. The forces 
that hold these parts together include workforce, organization, and industry, which is 
described as a stable system. See Diagram 3 (Cohesive and Stable System).81 An 
effective acquisition system requires stability and continuity that can only be achieved 
through the integration of the major elements upon which it depends as shown in the 
diagram.82  
                                                 
80 Acquisition Community Connection, “Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report,” 
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Diagram 3. Cohesive and Stable System83 
However, research and observation have indicated that differences in the theory 
and practice of acquisition, conflicts in values among the acquisition community, and 
changes in the security community, have driven the budget requirements and acquisition 
processes further apart. These external factors have created significant instability in the 
acquisition process. These competing values are shown within the triangle and include 
oversight, control over the budgets, requirements and acquisition.  
The “DAPA Report January 2006,” states, “In theory, new weapon systems are 
delivered as the result of the integrated actions of the three interdependent processes 
whose operations are held together by the efforts of the organization, workforce, and the 
industrial partnerships that manage them.84 However, in practice, these processes and 
practitioners often operate independent of each other. Actions in each of the processes  
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cause unintended negative consequences that magnify the effects in any one area. 
Incompatible actions are often caused by differences in organizational values among 
process owners and participants.”85  
Organization have disconnects in the workforce, industry and organization, many 
of these disconnects are based on competing organizational needs and values. The 
“DAPA Executive Report December 2005,” defines these values as driving factors that 
influence the acquisition process both directly and indirectly. See the Appendix for 
definitions of process principles, evaluation criteria and values.  
For instance, in an industry model, the critical issue is survival followed by 
predictability in the defense market segment and achieving stockholder confidence.86 
Additionally, the “DAPA Executive Report December 2005” states: “While each of these 
sets of values is legitimate, pursuing them without consideration for their impact in other 
processes adds instability to the overall acquisition process.”87 These factors are 
exacerbated by changes in the international security environment. Although the 
operational environment faced by the U.S. armed forces has changed significantly since 
the Cold War, the system used to design, develop and deliver the systems they need has 
not.88 Further, efforts to improve the performance of this system have focused almost 
entirely on only one part of the process, namely “little a” acquisition.89 This report 
indicates that although the procurement method is problematic, many of the issues 
driving the procurement are embedded within the acquisition system itself, and induced 
by the government itself.90 
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Although the findings of the DAPA Panel demonstrates that many of the issues 
that plague the acquisition system are government induced, this same model can also be 
applied to the space acquisition process. For example, these same forces are also present 
in the space acquisition process, and are the same basic elements present, which consist 
of a budget, requirement and acquisition that are held together by the workforce, industry 
and organization. The external competing forces and lack communication between the 
workforce, industry and organization has led to space projects becoming being poorly 
evaluated prior to project approval, further leading to other issues, such as over budgeted, 
failed delivery dates, and poorly managed projects.  
Another challenge that the space acquisition process faces is the inability to 
determine or predict problems that will occur late in the development process because the 
space project is going through approval phases prior to project completion. It is difficult 
to determine space project performance until the project has been launched; unlike 
weapons systems that can be tested and evaluated to determine performance flaws.  
In “Escaping the Space Acquisition Death Spiral,” the authors offer a different 
opinion of what the causes of the problems are with the space acquisition process. The 
authors argue that the problem with space procurement process is not acquisition system 
itself, but rather overinflated Technical Readiness Levels (TRL).91 The authors state, 
“Space Acquisition failures begin with overly optimistic technical readiness and resource 
estimates and resources estimates. Programmatic architectures and the technology 
readiness levels (TRL) needed to secure important objectives are left incomplete and 
inadequate. Without proper TRLs, or sufficient or-or off-ramps to add or delete 
technologies inserted into a program, the program’s baseline can easily become 
unexcitable. Such improperly base-lined and resourced acquisitions cannot achieve 
success.”92 
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The authors further state, “By allowing over inflated TRL levels and low-ball 
program bids discourages industry from becoming more efficient.93 This difficulty is 
compounded by a failure of most of the senior U.S. space leadership to recognize the true 
scope of the immense challenges confronting them.”94 
Additionally, the authors argue that a project’s downward spiral effect of a space 
project begins at the initiation phase. The key points that lead to project failure include 
unrealistic baselines, such as inadequate project budgets, inadequate project schedules, 
and lack of mature technology. As the project continues to move through the different 
phases, other issues began to emerge, such as cost growth, inadequate staffing, and 
scheduling delays. See Diagram 4, Acquisition Death Spiral. 
  
Diagram 4. Acquistion Death Spiral95 
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The Acquisition Death Spiral is interesting because it appears that once a project 
starts to face these different factors, it becomes difficult to change the outcome or move 
the project back on track, which leads to outcomes, such as project cancellation, program 
failure, increased project cost, and possibly failed project delivery dates. 
Additionally, it is can be argued that the creation of the Nunn-McCurdy Act was 
established to identify space and weapon projects before they even reach the downward 
spiral point, simply due to increased project threshold cost breaches. The Nunn-McCurdy 
breaches fall into two categories, significant breaches and critical breaches.96 A 
significant breach occurs when the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (the total cost of 
development, procurement, and construction cost divided by the number of units to be 
procured) increases 15% or more over the current baseline estimate or 30% or more over 
the original baseline estimate.97 A critical breach occurs when the program acquisition or 
procurement unit cost increases 25% or more over the current baseline estimate or 50% 
or more over the original baseline estimate.98 Thus, it would appear that Congress would 
have an additional tool to monitor projects based on performance in the event these 
projects request additional funds. At this time, Congress would take a close look at the 
value of each space project prior to approval of additional funds for projects grossly over 
budget. 
Although the authors has presented different views on potential acquisition 
breakdowns, the question still remains, Is the U.S. space procurement process effective 
enough to provide space projects to be completed and delivered in a manner to provide 
national security? The following chapter reviews space projects and discuses various 
problem areas. 
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V. SPACE SYSTEM CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The case study analysis focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of three troubled 
space system programs. Although these weaknesses were considered project failures in 
some cases, these programs are excellent learning tools with tremendous opportunities for 
progress and improvement. These models consist of the Space Based Infrared System 
(SBIRS), the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), and the Advanced Extremely High 
Frequency (AEHF) Satellite System. Although this thesis cannot conclusively identify all 
project-related and collateral problems, due to the uniqueness of each space system 
program, it does demonstrate several similarities that appear to be consistent with space 
system projects.  
A. SPACE BASED INFRARED SYSTEM (SBIRS) 
The U.S. Air Force created the SBIRS-High concept in 1996 with the goal of 
replacing the existing Defense Support System (DSP) for missile launch detection and 
warning capabilities.99 The SBIRS satellites provided sensors that have three times the 
sensitivity of the DSP, and two times the revisit rate, while providing better persistent 
coverage.100   
This satellite constellation was designed to perform four missions including 
missile defense, technical intelligence, and observing and reporting on military activities 
on the battlefield.101 The plan was for the system to consist of four operational GEO 
satellites (plus a ground spare), sensors on two classified DoD satellites in highly 
elliptical orbit (HEO), a ground-based Mission Control Station (MCS), and ground-based 
relay stations.102  
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The Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman team won the $2.16 billion contract to 
build the SBIRS in 1996.103 In September 2002, the DoD increased the contract to $4.18 
billion, which did not include three of the five satellites.104 Due to the institutional 
pressures to keep this program as opposed to scrapping it, roughly $10 billion was 
allocated to extending its life.105  Many of the problems that hindered the development of 
the SBIRS included massive hardware systems and software engineering shortfalls that 
generated budget and schedule failures. Additionally, SBIRS suffered setbacks when its 
flight software failed testing and its ground support equipment experienced problems.106 
The GAO identified other issues, such as a weak acquisition approach that led to 
oversight by the project contractors, immature technologies, unclear requirements, 
unstable funding, underestimated software complexity, poor oversight, and other 
problems that has resulted in billions of dollars in cost overruns and years in schedule 
delays.107  
The SBIRS-GEO is the newer version of the SBIRS High satellite. The SBIRS-
High HEO (High Elliptical Orbit) are payloads hosted on spacecraft. The first SBIRS 
High payload was declared operational in November 2008; however, it was pushed back 
many times from the original launch date of 2002 for many of the reasons stated 
above.108 The SBIRS GEO-1 was not delivered to Cape Canaveral until March 2011, and 
the launch occurred in May 2011.109  As of March 2012, SBIRS HEO -1 and HEO-2 are 
in use, and SBIRS GEO-1 is on orbit and performing well.110  The Air Force is set to 
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launch the SBIRS GEO-2 in March 2013.111  The Geo-3 and Geo-4 have run into some 
technical problems and will not be operational until 2018.112 
B. FUTURE IMAGERY ARCHITECTURE (FIA) 
The FIA project was one of several programs to break down leaving the United 
States with outdated imaging technology.113 The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
formally proposed the FIA program to Congress on March 6, 1997. This program was 
initially designed to capitalize on available small satellite technology to address the needs 
of tomorrow’s customers.114 The program had roughly a $5 billion dollar budget at the 
onset.  
This satellite system promised to deliver collected data at a much-reduced interval 
between images, thus complicating the lives of terrorists, drug lords, and weapons 
proliferators who posed national security challenges and risks.115 The FIA program was 
classified and did not receive the project scrutiny that unclassified space projects would 
normally receive, which is evident by the project contract bidding and selection process, 
as well as the limited project oversight. Also, questions arose at the beginning regarding 
the maturity of the project technology, and whether the technical goals were attainable 
given the budget and project schedule at the onset,116 not to mention if enough funding 
and resources were available to complete this program.117  
The selection of the contractor was another critical problem with this project. In 
most cases, contractors are selected based on past performance, project expertise and 
performance cost. However, in this case, Lockheed Martin, the longtime reconnaissance 
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satellite incumbent was not selected.118 Additionally, it was known that Boeing had never 
built the kind of spy satellites that the U.S. Government was looking to acquire.  
Other questionable issues included project oversight, and whether a clear pathway 
of open communication about project progress even existed. Boeing was given project 
oversight for monitoring its own work under the new government policy of shifting 
control of big military projects to contractors. Boeing was providing reassuring reports to 
the White House that the project could meet the proposed time schedules.  
FIA was discontinued in September 2005 a year after the first satellite was to be 
launched because of technical difficulties, with cost overruns estimated at roughly $18 
million.119  
C. ADVANCED EXTREMELY HIGH FREQUENCY (AEHF) SATELLITE  
The AEHF program began in April 1999, and development started in September 
2001.120 The original launch date was scheduled for June 2004. This satellite is designed 
to support twice as many tactical networks as the current Milstar II satellites, while 
providing 10–12 times the bandwidth capacity and six times the data rate of speed.121 
Milstar is the tactical and strategic multiservice satellite system designed to provide 
survivable communications for the U.S. Air Force Space Missile Center.122 The original 
AEHF was originally designed and developed as a joint service satellite communications 
to provide global, secure, protected, and jam-resistant communications for high-priority 
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military ground, sea and air assets.123 The original cost for this project was roughly $6.15 
billion for five satellites, and the first launch was scheduled for late 2007.124 
Due to resource and technical problems, optional satellites four and five were 
deleted from the project, with the intention of making AEHF “only an interim bridge to 
the larger Transformation Satellite Network (TSAT) program.”125 However, the TSAT 
had its own technical and resources problems. In addition, its leadership was unable to 
circumvent them. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates canceled the TSAT.126 Upon 
further review of the reduction of the AEHF satellites as the military’s main future 
guarantors of secure, hardened bandwidth, efforts to look at the overall gap created by 
TSAT’s removal led to the restoration of AEHF-5, and the addition of a sixth satellite.127 
As of 2009, the program total was $10.3 billion for four satellites, a per-unit cost 
increase of 109.3%. R&D costs had jumped 51.7%, from $4.75 billion to $7.2 billion, but 
procurement costs skyrocketed even faster. From an initial estimate of $1.4 billion for 
five satellites (mean average of $281 million per), procurement costs rose to $3.1 billion 
for four (mean avg. of $775 million per). In the April 2010 Selection Acquisition Report 
(SAR), the program had settled in at total research and development and production 
estimates of $12.45 billion for six satellites. On a per-satellite basis, it is still a 67.2% 
jump from the 2001 baseline.128 See Diagram 5. 
The AEHF Space Vehicle-1 (SV-1) launched in August 2010, almost three years 
after its original scheduled launch date. The AEHF (SV-2 and SV-3) both ran into 
technical failures and project delays, but the SV-2 eventually was launched in May 2012, 
roughly a year later than its previous scheduled launch date. The SV-3 missed its January 
2012 launch date; however, it is scheduled to launch January 2013.  
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Diagram 5. Differences in Unit Costs from Program Start and Most Recent 
Estimates129 
Diagram 5 also illustrates initial and recent cost growths for both the SBIRS High 
and AEHF space programs, as well as other space programs. This diagram also illustrates 
the cost growth based on program changes, such as adding an additional satellite to the 
program leading to space program delays.  
The DoD has identified a number of causes of cost growth and related problems 
prevalent in the aforementioned models, which include creating a competition for funding 
that encourages overly low cost estimating, optimistic scheduling, overpromising, 
suppressing bad news, and starting projects with immature technology. Additionally, the  
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DoD has too many continuous on-going programs, and is required to shift funds from 
program to programs, particularly as programs experience technical and resource 
problems.130 See Diagram 6.131 
 
Diagram 6. Key Underlying Problems That Can Break Acquisitions 
Although, Diagram 6 demonstrates multiple causes that can lead to broken 
acquisition, it begins with immature technology. One of the noticeable key problems 
during the research of this thesis was that many of these space programs started with 
immature technology. In other words, the technology needed for the project to complete 
its various stages was not fully tested, or developed. It can normally be presumed that 
before a project can be completed, a reasonable amount of the technology for finishing 
the project would have to be completed at a basic level just to deliver it in a timely 
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manner. However, this was not the case, and projects were awarded to contractors before 
the research and development was completed. It appears that immature technology alone 
in these space programs could lead to technical delays and program changes, because it is 
not always clear what the technical problems will be until the space system program has 
started.  
John D. Christie, argues three causes for program cost growth: 1) overly 
ambitious requirements, 2) immature technologies, and 3) unrealistically low projections 
of costs in all function areas.132 He suggests three parallel actions for the DoD, as well as 
Congress, could lead to project success. These actions include, firstly, prior to awarding 
any space program contracts, ensure that every requirement has a reasonable probability 
of being achieved within the desired time and that it will add value, which is consistent 
with program cost. Secondly, acquisition managers should use applied research programs 
and advanced technology demonstrations before inserting them in formal acquisition 
programs. Lastly, resource allocation managers need to avoid large disruptive changes in 
all functional areas that might require project modifications and changes.133 Although 
this approach, as suggested by the author, may appear to be very simplistic and practical, 
they appear to be critical missing components in weapons and space acquisition 
programs. 
Over the past several years, the DoD has made efforts to reform how weapons and 
space systems are acquired, through its own initiatives, as well as those required by 
statute. The goal of these efforts has been to increase both effectiveness and efficiency. 
For space, efforts have been made to ensure that the requirements are clearly defined 
early in the process and that the design remains stable.134 The DoD is also providing 
more program and contractor oversight and implementing military standards and 
specifications to improve the efficiency of the acquisition process.  
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Additionally the DoD and the Air Force are working to streamline both 
management and oversight of the national security space enterprise by centralizing 
project leadership. An example is that Air Force space system acquisition responsibility 
has been aligned to the office responsible for all other Air Force acquisitions efforts, and 
the Defense Space Council, which was created last year, is reviewing options for 
streamlining the many committees, boards, and councils involved in space issues.  
Table 1 defines these space acquisitions outcomes, actions taken or being taken 
that could benefit space system acquisition outcomes.135 
 
Table 1, continues on following pages 
 
Acquisition Outcomes 
Category Actions 
National Policy 
In June 2010, the President of the United States 
issued the new National Space Policy that 
establishes overarching national policy for the 
conduct of U.S. space activities. The policy states 
that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
National Intelligence are responsible for 
developing, acquiring, and operating space systems 
and supporting information systems and networks 
to support U.S. national security and enable defense 
and intelligence operations. The policy helps to 
clarify the Secretary of Defense’s roles and 
responsibilities for coordinating space system 
acquisitions that span DoD and federal agencies, 
such as those for space situational awareness. 
In January 2011, the Secretary of Defense and the 
Director of National Intelligence issued the 
National Security Space Strategy to build on the 
National Space Policy and help inform planning, 
programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis. 
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Acquisition Outcomes 
Category Actions 
Acquisition Policy 
The Secretary of Defense expressed concern over 
DoD’s tailored national security space acquisition 
policy—initially issued in 2003—primarily because 
it did not alter DoD’s practice of committing to 
major investments before knowing what resources 
will be required to deliver promised capability. 
Instead, the policy encouraged development of 
leading-edge technology within product 
development, that is, at the same time the program 
manager is designing the system and undertaking 
other product development activities. In 2009, DoD 
eliminated the existing space acquisition policy and 
moved the acquisition of space systems under 
DoD’s updated acquisition guidance for defense 
acquisition programs (DoD Instruction 5000.02). In 
October 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics issued a 
new space acquisition policy to be incorporated 
into DoD Instruction 5000.02 that introduces 
specific management and oversight processes for 
acquiring major space systems, including retaining 
the requirement for independent program 
assessments to be conducted prior to major 
acquisition milestones. 
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Acquisition Outcomes 
Category Actions 
Management and Oversight 
In August 2010, the Secretary of Defense 
announced the elimination of the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 
Information Integration (ASD/NII) as part of a 
broader effort to eliminate organizations that 
perform duplicative functions or that have outlived 
their purpose.  The elimination of this organization 
may help to reduce the problems associated with 
the wide range of stakeholders within DoD 
responsible for overseeing the development of 
space- based capabilities. 
In May 2009, Air Force leadership signed the 
Acquisition Improvement Plan that lists five 
initiatives for improving how the Air Force obtains 
new capabilities. One of these initiatives relates to 
establishing clear lines of authority and 
accountability within acquisition organizations.  
In August 2010, the Secretary of the Air Force 
transferred space system acquisition responsibility 
from the Under Secretary of the Air Force to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition, thereby placing all Air Force 
acquisition responsibility under one office. As part 
of this realignment, the Program Executive Officer 
for Space now reports to the Assistant Secretary of 
the Air Force for Acquisition (previously, the 
Program Executive Officer for Space reported to 
the Under Secretary of the Air Force). 
Table 1.   Actions Taken or Being Taken That Could Benefit Space System Acquisition 
Outcomes136 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Various problems have impacted space procurement. The outcome of many of 
these issues has led to failed space programs, project redesigns, significant program cost 
increases, as well as project delays. This thesis has uncovered several weaknesses with 
the procurement process, as well the difficulties involved with correcting these problems. 
Although the space and defense procurement processes are systems that face their own 
complexities, and difficulties, many of the factors affecting acquisition included 
effectiveness of the acquisition process itself as it relates to a variety of space programs, 
the selection process of the contractors, program management and oversight, program 
funding, and encouraging mature technology at project onset.  
Nonetheless, the space acquisitions process has made significant progress in terms 
of improving effectiveness and efficiency. Many of the changes imposed on space 
acquisition have happened within the past three years. Most of the changes implemented 
by DoD include utilizing a higher degree of patience and discretion when considering 
space projects. Two examples are verifying the needs of requirement and ensuring the 
technology is sound before contracts are awarded. Also, the DoD is placing more 
emphasis on realistic project cost and timelines.137  
Additional acquisition reform was introduced by Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates (no longer in office) and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics Ashton B. Carter in a 23-point plan. The intent of this reform was to 
improve U.S. spending practices and identify issues that lead to programs not being 
delivered on time. Mr. Gates and Dr. Carter stated, “We have set out to save you at least 
100 billion over five years in our purchasing of goods and services, which accounts for 
$400 billion of the $700 billion in annual defense spending.”138 Dr. Carter’s, 23-Point 
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plan covers five major areas. Its objectives include: 1) target affordability and control 
growth, 2) incentivize productivity and innovation in industry, 3) promote real 
competition, 4) improve tradecraft in services acquisitions, and 5) reduce non-productive 
processes and bureaucracy.139 
Dr. Carter defined target affordability and control growth as requiring that 
acquisitions professionals and suppliers not only plan for what programs should cost, but 
also not rely on historical estimates of what projects will cost.140 Currently, this approach 
has been applied to weapons programs and found to be successful.141  
Secondly, Carter sets a goal of incentivizing productivity and innovation in the 
industry. A strong emphasis has been placed on strengthening the connection between 
profit and performance in business practices by rewarding contractors for controlling 
their production costs, delivering products ahead of schedule deadlines, as well as 
demonstrating exemplary performance.142 
Thirdly, Carter emphasizes that, “We must remove the barriers that prevent 
effective competition by encouraging more contractors to participate in program bidding, 
and selecting vendors that provide the best product at the best price.”143  Dr. Carter 
stated, “We need to stop deluding ourselves with the idea that directed buys from two 
designated suppliers represent real competition.”144 He further stated real competition is 
the single most important tool available to the department to drive productivity.145 
Fourthly, this plan addressed more aggressive management oversight over 
contract support services.146  Carter stated, “In 2009, the Department spent more than 
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$212 billion in contracting services, using more than 100,000 contract vehicles held by 
32,200 contractors, with more than 50 percent awarded to roughly 100 contractors.”147 
Carter further states, “Our practices for buying such services are even less effective than 
buying weapons systems.”148 
Lastly, Carter’s plan seeks to reduce non-productive processes and bureaucracy. 
Dr. Carter stated, “Unnecessary and low- value added processes and document 
requirements are a significant drag on the acquisition productivity and must be 
aggressively identified and eliminated.149 He further states, “We cannot achieve cost 
goals, and award incentives to contractors with the processes we have in place.”150 One 
of the key strategies to eliminating non-productive strategies and bureaucracy is 
abolishing low value-added stator processes by being cautious of the McCurdy reprocess. 
This process, as stated previously, provides Congress with budget approval oversight 
when programs are experiencing cost growth. Carter stated, “The acquisition process can 
be streamlined in a way that we can make sound decisions about the future of program 
and provide Congress with the information and certifications they need without overly 
burdening programs.”151  
Upon examining the problems that impacted the acquisition process, the author 
agrees with the recommendations presented by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics Ashton 
B. Carter. Additionally, the 23-point plan introduced by Carter is very broad and can be 
applied to both the defense weapon systems and space program acquisition process. 
Nonetheless, the author believes that implementing and providing oversight, as well as 
measuring the success of the 23-point plan has not been clearly explained or defined. He  
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believes that more research can be provided in this area. Additionally, this thesis offers 
several recommendations that can further provide assistance to the existing challenges 
defined in space acquisition.     
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Require mature technology prior to awarding contracts on space programs 
with incentives to contractors that present the results of their research and 
development. 
2. Encourage a stronger transition from old space systems to advanced 
systems.  
3. Select the best and most qualified personnel both civilian and military to 
manage and oversee space programs.  
4. Ensure that adequate funds are set aside for the entire life cycle of a space 
project prior to space system approval, where feasible to avoid security 
gaps.   
5. Cancel space systems projects that show early signs of technical 
difficulties or project delays to ensure funds are not wasted.  
6. Encourage research and development primarily for space systems 
programs to ensure mature space program technology.   
B. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, this thesis identified several space acquisition problems that potentially 
could have been disastrous for the United States. As stated previously, the acquisition process is 
extremely broad. However, it was the intent of this research to focus on the concerns presented 
by the government, which ultimately falls on the shoulders of the taxpayers. The concerns 
explored included project re-designs, significant program cost increases, project delays and 
failed space programs. Space programs are critical to the United States because they provide 
early missile detection and imaging technology that can be used for predict natural disasters, 
such as super storm sandy, or to provide images to prevent potential terrorist attacks. 
Furthermore, the goal of this research was to identify problems with the space acquisition 
process, so the United States can transition from old technology to new technology in a more 
effective manner without leaving the country technically, or economically vulnerable.  
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APPENDIX. LIST OF PROCESS PRINCIPLES, EVALUATION 
CRITERIA AND VALUES152 
A. MDA-PRINCIPLES–PAGE 27 
a.) Mission Success: The overarching principle behind all National Security 
Space programs is mission success. When acquiring space systems, 
mission success must be the first consideration when assessing the risks 
and trades among cost, schedule, and performance. Risk management, test 
planning, system engineering, and funding profiles must be driven by this 
objective. 
b.) Accountability: The acquisition execution chain is ultimately accountable 
for a program's success or failure. The SPD/PM, as the leader of the 
Government-Contractor team for a program, must be accountable and 
have the authority to accomplish the program's objectives and meet the 
user's needs. The PEO or CAE and the DoD Space MDA have the 
responsibility to provide the SPD/PM with the resources and guidance 
necessary to accomplish these goals. 
c.) Streamlined/Agile: The NSS acquisition team should work to reduce the 
acquisition decision cycle time and have short, clear lines of authority with 
decision making and program execution at the lowest levels possible. Staff 
elements, at all levels, exist to advise the acquisition decision making 
principals (i.e., DoD Space MDA, CAE, PEO, SPD/PM). No more than 
two layers can be between the SPD/PM and the MDA. (Ref: 5000.1) 
d.)  Inclusive: Advice and information should be actively sought from all 
parties with an interest in NSS programs. A collegial/team relationship 
among all government, academia, and industry partners is the goal.  
DoD Space acquisition plans and documents should be coordinated with 
the appropriate lead user/operating command.  
e.)  Flexible: The “model” acquisition processes outlined in this document 
should be tailored to properly fit the circumstances of each NSS program. 
Only those activities, reports, plans, coordination’s, or reviews required by 
statute or directed by the NSS acquisition execution chain are required. 
f.)  Stable: Within a given acquisition increment, stable budgets, stable 
requirements, stable direction, and low personnel turnover are necessary 
for successful program acquisition. Decisions made by the acquisition 
execution chain must be durable. 
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g.) Disciplined: All parties to this space acquisition policy must exercise the 
discipline necessary to achieve its goals without allowing its procedures to 
become unnecessarily burdensome and/or time consuming. 
h.)  Credible: The NSS team must deliver what it promises on schedule and 
within budget. The NSS process is meant to incentivize and foster quality 
decision making for programs that exhibit the necessary maturity to 
proceed into the next acquisition phase.  
i.) Cost Realism: The goal is to develop and grow a world-class national 
security space cost estimating capability. Cost estimates must be 
independent and accomplished in a timely, realistic, and complete manner. 
Cost will be controlled by estimating accurately and focusing on quality to 
reduce rework and achieve mission success. All members of the NSS 
acquisition execution chain must insist on, and protect, a realistic 
management reserve.  
B. MDA-PROJECT5 EVALUATION PROCESS—PAGE 29 
5.1 Joint Capabilities integration and Development System needs. (For the IC, 
the Mission Requirements Board (MRB) defines and prioritizes future 
The JCIDS process identifies, develops, and validates all defense-related 
capability national foreign intelligence needs within substantive mission areas and drives 
those needs into intelligence planning, resource, and large system acquisition decisions.) 
CJCSI 3170.01D describes the JCIDS process and serves as the governing capability 
needs process document for this NSS policy. A disciplined capability needs process is 
key to achieving effective and timely acquisitions within expected budgets. Users and 
operators are responsible for comprehensive, clear, and timely identification of capability 
needs through the JCIDS process. Space system SPDs/PMs are responsible for supporting 
the JCIDS process by providing users and operators with timely, credible programmatic 
implications (cost, schedule, and risk) of meeting operational capability needs. 
SPDs/PMs should work closely with the users and operators to support the development 
of the Key Performance Parameters. This will allow the users and operators to make 
informed decisions. Within the DoD, the capability needs validation authority and 
acquisition authority are separate.  
5.2  Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Process (PPBE) 
The PPBE process translates military capability needs into budgetary 
requirements, which are presented to Congress for funding consideration. Each of the 
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functions of the PPBE operates on a near-continuous basis throughout the fiscal year. 
Within the DoD, the budget authority and the acquisition decision authority are separate.  
5.3  National Security Space (NSS) Acquisition Process 
The NSS model emphasizes the decision needs for “high-tech” small quantity 
NSS programs. The funding profile for a typical NSS program is usually front-loaded 
when compared to a production-focused system. Defense Acquisition Performance 
Assessment (DAPA) Executive Report December 2005, Defines Organization Values: 
• Organizations providing oversight and coordination of “little a” 
acquisition activities value compliance, consistency of approach and 
control of program activities 
• The workforce is incentivized by job satisfaction, the opportunity for 
continuous training and stability in the process. 
• The budget process values how much and when to buy and focuses on 
control and oversight to balance the instability that advocacy creates. 
• The requirements process values the “why” and “what to buy” issues, 
focusing on obtaining the ability to achieve mission success at lowest cost 
in lives. 
• The “little a” acquisition process values “how to buy.” It strives to balance 
cost, schedule and performance. 
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